3 Letter from W. Kisiero and E. Kiberence to His Excellency the President, Daniel T. arap Moi, 29 March 1979; from the personal archives of a local resident.

4 Citizens of Chepkitale to Your Excellency the President of the Republic of Kenya, Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces Hon. D.T. arap Moi, 16 October 1988; from the personal archives of a local resident.

5 Letter from Provincial Commissioner Western Province to Simon Psiwa, Johnson Changeiywo, Philip Cheluget and Geoffrey Taragon, 30 December 1993; from the personal archives of a local resident.

6 Yator Kiptum, Chairman of the Hunter-Gatherers Forum, "Eviction, Brutality and Displacement of Ogiek", 4 March 2004 (www.ogiek.org).

7 Dr J. Changeiywo and Martin Simotwo, "Genocide Against the Chepkitale Ogiek Continues", 12 July 2004 (www.ogiek.org).

8 Some local commentators claim that the SDLF came into existence some time before this, but that its violent activities only became evident at the point of the phase III allocations.

9 For a full account of the events briefly described in this section, see HRW 2008; IMLU 2008; KNHRC 2008; MSF 2008.

# 6 Democratization and determinants of ethnic violence

## The rebel–moderate organizational nexus

*Jacques Bertrand and Sanjay Jeram*

Democratization constitutes a crucial moment in the historical relationship between ethnic groups and the state. A more open political space allows greater flexibility to express grievances, exert political pressure, and seek greater representation in reformed political institutions. By contrast, authoritarian political settings offer few avenues. When groups are not repressed to the point of paralysis, they can organize protests, demonstrations, or other extra-institutional forms of expressing grievances. On rare occasions, ethnic groups that are not dominant within the institutional apparatus of the state can gain access to power and resources, when they are integrated into the regime through patrimonial relationships or other forms of regime cooptation. In many instances, of course, ethnic groups use violent means to rebel against the state.

The loosening grip of an authoritarian regime, or its sudden demise, represents an opportunity for mobilization. As discussed by Haklai and Bertrand in the introduction to this volume, this institutional change produces a variety of possible outcomes, from violent uprisings to new modes of peacefully channelling demands via renewed political institutions. How ethnic groups react to a changing political environment depends on a number of factors. On the state side, the provision of channels to express grievances is likely to reduce the propensity to mobilize violently; the continued use of security forces to suppress minority discontent can also prevent open mobilization or, alternatively, stimulate a backlash and intensify minority resolve to counter it. The choice to mobilize and the type of mobilization will vary also according to characteristics of groups themselves, such as their size, or territorial concentration, but they also depend on organization. Mobilization requires first that leaders persuade ethnic group members to engage in their chosen political action. The success of recruitment and following may determine the ability to sustain mobilization or its chosen type.

The number, nature, and diversity of in-group organizations constitute an important, often neglected, factor influencing responses to a new political environment. Ethnic groups are not monolithic entities that mobilize *en masse* in peaceful or violent ways to advance their interests. Ethnically based organizations constitute the most relevant unit of group mobilization. These organizations vary tremendously in terms of their size, degree of support, extent of armed

capacity, and preferred methods of advancing group interests. Furthermore, within single ethnic groups they often compete for mass support and legitimacy.

The effects of democratization on violent ethnic conflict, as we argue in this chapter, are mediated in part by the in-group competition between ethnic organizations. When a regime democratizes, the previous configuration of in-group organizations is often changed significantly. For instance, an armed organization claiming sole representation of an ethnic group might compete with a civilian one seeking representation in newly democratic institutions. Groups previously divided into several organizations may see their relative support dramatically transformed. After the fall of an authoritarian regime, in-group competition is associated with higher levels of violence, as armed organizations outbid more moderate ones to remain relevant. When organizations cooperate or when one dominates, violence against other ethnic groups tends to diminish.

## The role of organizations in ethnic conflict

Ethnic groups are rarely homogeneous unitary actors. They are typically divided and their goals may not always converge. Ethnic violence is perpetrated not by ethnic groups as such but by organizations that purport to represent the dominant viewpoint; yet this is rarely the case (Brubaker 2004). At one extreme, ethnic organizations take the form of political parties that espouse moderate goals such as increased autonomy or improved citizenship rights, pursuing their goals through formal institutions. At the other, organizations operate clandestinely, using terrorism and tactics of guerrilla warfare to pressure the state into ceding to their demands. The number of organizations claiming to represent a group, and the differences between their goals and tactics, are good indicators of intra-group divisions.

Ethnic political parties generally behave differently than non-ethnic parties. They form around group interests and often position themselves as seeking objectives that diverge from those of the broader society. Ethnically defined interests often render compromise with other groups difficult. If ethnic group members rally around one ethnic party, the latter will promote narrow group claims more ardently, which makes it less likely that a non-ethnic party will mediate in group conflict. If they divide their support among two or more parties, conflict may also ensue. Rank-and-file group members are not mindless followers, and will often shift their support if they are not satisfied with the ideologies or policies of their current party (Horowitz 1985: 291–332). The politics of "ethnic outbidding" make sense in this light – a dominant ethnic party attempts to defeat competition by espousing maximalist demands that cast its competitors as traitors (Rabushka and Shepsle 1972). The result is often a slide towards violence as the majority and minority ethnic groups see their goals as mutually incompatible. Regardless of the scenario, as Brancati (2009) has shown, the emergence of ethnic political parties is often associated with higher levels of ethnic violence.

Insurgent or rebel groups operate outside of the political process. Grievance-based theories explain their emergence and, in particular, their success at recruitment on material or political disadvantages experienced by an ethnic group (Gurr 1993, 2000). More recent studies emphasize political and economic opportunities motivating rebels to choose a violent path. Where natural resources are abundant and easily exploitable, insurgent groups can often recruit poor young males with few chances of legitimate material advancement (Collier and Hoeffler 1998). Yet, insurgency also depends on state strength as the opportunity arises, generally when the state is weak (Fearon and Laitin 2003). At a micro level, the decision to participate in rebellion, however, is difficult to assess, since there are multiple reasons that vary according to the nature of conflict, even within a single civil war (Kalyvas 2006).

There could be various reasons why ethnic groups spawn more than one organization and why their *intra*-group interaction can sometimes increase *inter*-group violence. In the aftermath of peace settlements, for instance, "spoilers" sometimes try to undermine compromises that more moderate organizations reach with other ethnic groups (Stedman 1997; Sisk 1996). A rebel group on the fringes of the settlement might increase its use of violence because its demands haven't been met or through fear that its organization will disappear. Even without spoilers, a negotiation process can cause a rift within an organization, pushing extremists to form a splinter group. Spoilers can also be inside the peace process; an organization sometimes agrees to a settlement but then fails to abide by its rules when a rival organization outbids it and attracts its prior supporters. When, then, do leaders drive ethnic organizations and when do followers constrain its agenda?

To some extent all ethnic organizations, as well as the central state, are constrained by popular support. It is obvious that ethnic political parties need votes to gain seats in regional and national parliaments, but extremists are also very aware of shifts in the sentiments of their constituency. Ethnic terrorist groups, such as the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (Basque Homeland and Freedom – ETA), have been quite selective in their targets for attacks and reduced their use of violence at strategic moments when there has been concern that their support base was eroding (Sanchez-Cuenca 2007). Ethnic rebel organizations in the developing world tend to vary more in their sensitivity to mass support; those which have become overrun with criminals that use ethnicity to mask self-interested intentions are generally less concerned with public support (Kemp 2004). At the same time, rebels require a constant stream of new recruits and a supportive constituency to provide resources and "safe havens" from state forces. This means that the strategies which rebel and moderate organizations choose in response to changing circumstances is somewhat determined by whether or not they can pursue a particular option (e.g. violence, disarmament, signing a peace agreement) without alienating their existing and potential supporters.

Organizations representing the same ethnic group, therefore, may develop diverging goals, and concerns about mass support may influence their strategic choices. When organizations compete for representation of an ethnic group, they are constrained by shifts in their support base. The broader institutional

environment conditions the structure of incentives or disincentives for following more violent-prone or moderate organizations.

## Democratization, ethnic organizations, and violence

Democratization represents an exogenous shock that alters the incentives, strategies, and number of ethnic organizations. Rebels that pursue violent strategies in authoritarian contexts generally have the support of their ethnic group because minorities are usually repressed. A genuine transition to democratic competition can undermine this support, however, because moderate organizations are empowered to pursue group goals such as autonomy or minority rights through political institutions. If no moderate organization exists under authoritarian rule, democratization presents an opportunity for "soft-liners" within rebel organizations to create one and vie for group support.

Competition among moderate and rebel organizations can lead to violent outcomes in one of two ways. The first is similar to the classic pattern of outbidding, in which rebels use violence to solicit a heavy-handed response from the state and increase their support from members of their ethnic group. The second occurs when rebel organizations develop profit-oriented motives for continuing warfare. This is more likely to occur when rebel groups gain control of resource-rich areas and use their armed capacity to defend against incursions by state forces.

In some instances, however, democratization may reduce competition between organizations. When a rebel group never achieved a position of dominance during the authoritarian period, newly empowered moderate organizations can co-opt rebels. In this case, a rebel organization expects poor chances of survival outside of formal politics.

In order to explore the relationship between democratization, violence, and the interaction of intra-group ethnic organizations, we first use a large dataset to identify relevant cases; second, we select six cases for analysis of the mechanisms involved. We use Polity IV scores and Minorities at Risk (MAR) data to classify cases in which violence increased after democratic transitions and those in which it decreased. Transitions only include cases where one can identify first the demise of an authoritarian regime, then the establishment of a minimal democratic regime through elections or a very significant shift in basic political freedoms. In the Polity IV dataset, we identify such a shift as a 3-point positive change in the total score where the initial score is negative and the subsequent score is positive. We impose a further selection rule: we limit our cases to those where a transition remained relatively stable and did not revert to an authoritarian regime. By doing so, we capture cases where the process of democratization was sufficiently genuine and significant to avoid a quick collapse. This prevents us from selecting cases where mobilization by ethnic organizations was primarily triggered by the false nature of a transition.

In Table 6.1, cases in bold represent those where a transition occurred and democratic practices remained. Even in those cases, we observe a relatively even distribution across the three columns, thereby confirming that ethnic organizations respond differently to democratization, sometimes becoming more peaceful and at other times more violent.

According to these classifications, we selected a few cases to trace changes relating to ethnic organizations and their role in increasing or reducing violence after democratization.

Table 6.1 Short-term effects of democratic transition on ethnic rebellion

| Major increase in rebellion after transition (+3) | Minor increase or stable rebellion after transition (+1–2) | Decrease in rebellion after transition |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Mende (*Sierra Leone*) | Baluchis (*Pakistan*) | Serbs (**Croatia**) |
| Lozi (*Zambia*) | Mohajirs (*Pakistan*) | Kosovo Albanians (*Yugoslavia*) |
| Mayans (**Mexico**) | Ijaw (*Nigeria*) | Baluchis (*Iran*) |
| Acehnese (**Indonesia**) | Ibo (*Nigeria*) | Kurds (*Iran*) |
| Malay – Muslims (*Thailand*) | Indigenous Peoples (**Chile**) | Afars (*Djibouti*) |
| Kurds (**Turkey**) | Vietnamese (*Cambodia*) | Afars (*Ethiopia*) |
| Ankole (*Uganda*) | Indigenous Peoples (**Panama**) | Tigreans (*Ethiopia*) |
| Baganda (*Uganda*) | Kikuyu (*Kenya*) | Tuareg (*Niger*) |
| Kakwa (*Uganda*) | Greeks (**Albania**) | Tuareg (*Mali*) |
| Abkhazians (*Georgia*) | Karamojong (*Uganda*) | M'Boshi (*Republic of Congo*) |
| South Ossetians (*Georgia*) | Chittagong Hill Tribes (*Bangladesh*) | Bembe (*Zambia*) |
| Gagauz (**Moldova**) | Russians (**Lithuania**) | Mende (*Sierra Leone*) |
| Slavs (**Moldova**) | Albanians (**Macedonia**) | Tenne (*Sierra Leone*) |
| Chechens (*Russia*) | Avars (*Russia*) | Acholi (*Uganda*) |
| | Ingush (*Russia*) | Langi (*Uganda*) |
| | Highland Indigenous Peoples (*Bolivia*) | Miskitos (**Nicaragua**) |
| | Lowland Indigenous Peoples (**Bolivia**) | Indigenous Peoples (*Guatemala*) |
| | Indigenous Peoples (**Panama**) | Papuans (**Indonesia**) |
| | Indigenous Peoples (**Chile**) | Cordillera (**Philippines**) |
| | Diolas (*Senegal*) | Merina (*Madagascar*) |
| | Basques (**Spain**) | Amazonian Indians (**Brazil**) |
| | Moros (**Philippines**) | Xhosa (**South Africa**) |
| | Europeans (**South Africa**) | |
| | Zulus (**South Africa**) | |

Sources: Marshall and Jaggers (2010); Minorities at Risk (2009).

Notes
a Democratic transitions include country cases that move from a negative to a positive number with at least a 3-point change in their Polity score within a three-year span. Rebellion is determined by the highest score reached by the group on the MAR rebellion scale (0–7) within a five-year period before and after the transition. Countries in **bold** have consolidated their democratic status since the transition (moved up to and remained at a Polity score of 7 through 2007). Countries in *italics* have either remained semi-democracies or reverted to authoritarian rule.
b The table includes cases from countries such as Moldova and Georgia even though they did not technically go through democratic transitions as independent states. Selecting cases for analysis from these countries would be problematic because we would be conflating processes of state-building with democratization (Doorenspleet 2000).
c Cases with missing values that prevent an assessment of democratization and/or rebellion are excluded from the table.

We select cases across the range of variation to identify processes leading to increases and reductions in violence after democratization. The Miskitos and Papuans are two cases in which significant ethnic rebellion all but disappeared following the democratic transitions in Nicaragua and Indonesia respectively. The cases of the Basques and the Acehnese are paired together because violence between ETA and Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (Free Aceh Movement – GAM) and the Spanish and Indonesian states respectively reached a peak in the immediate aftermath of democratization, but declined over the longer term. In the Philippines and Senegal, ethnic violence between state forces and ethnic rebel groups has been a persistent problem that appears minimally affected by democratization. In authoritarian, transitional, and stable democratic contexts, the Moros and Diola have had consistently high scores on ethnic rebellion in the MAR dataset.

## Basques (Spain)

Prior to the 1890s, the ethnic and cultural distinctiveness of the four Basque provinces of Spain had not produced a nationalist organization. The abolition of the *fueros* (ancient laws) in 1874 – which bestowed political autonomy upon the provincial authorities in the Basque Country – was the source of much resentment. The father of Basque nationalism, Sabino Arana, drew upon nostalgia for the *fueros* to develop a modern nationalist movement in favour of complete separation from Spain (Sullivan 1988: 5). He managed to appeal to a significant portion of the Basque masses and to create the group's first political organization in 1895, the Partido Nacionalista Vasco (Basque Nationalist Party – PNV).

Before his death in 1903, Arana changed the goal of the PNV from independence to autonomy, provoking intra-party conflict that has persisted throughout the party's existence. Nevertheless, the PNV remained the only significant representative of the Basques until well after the installation of Franco's authoritarian regime. In the face of a strengthening dictatorship that was brutally repressive of Basque culture, a small group of Basque youths formed the group Ekin (To Act) to discuss their dissatisfaction with the PNV's moderate tactics and devise a more radical path to independence. At first, Ekin tried to merge with the PNV's youth wing, but tensions between the groups heightened as Ekin became increasingly frustrated with the PNV's moderate tactics of resistance (e.g. cultural festivals), and the latter with the former's intransigence and impatience (Clark 1979: 156). In 1959, Ekin and hundreds of members from the PNV's youth wing merged to form ETA, an organization that, unlike the PNV, believed that self-rule could not be achieved through participation in established political institutions.

The early period of ETA was marked by internal disputes over its ideology and competition with the PNV. The PNV's conservative and catholic orientation alienated Basques on the political left from the nationalist movement. Consequently, left-leaning ETA elites saw an opportunity to appeal to Basque workers. They attempted to use ETA as a vehicle to pursue socialist goals in collaboration with other left-leaning Spanish parties and social movements, and to subordinate its nationalist agenda (Clark 1979: 161). Those favouring a socialist agenda called themselves ETA-Berri (New ETA) and labelled their opponents ETA-Zarra (Old ETA). ETA-Berri were expelled from the organization at the Fifth Assembly in 1967 because of their willingness to coalesce with Spanish parties and social movements, and ETA-Zarra retained the moniker ETA. ETA did experience some success combining nationalism and socialism to increase their support base, but this uneasy marriage of ideologies would continue to cause rifts within ETA and prevent it from gaining broader legitimacy during the 1960s.

ETA began its campaign of violence in pursuit of an independent Basque Country in 1968 with the murder of a Spanish Civil Guard officer and a police chief in Gipuzkoa. Subsequent events conformed to the group's adopted "action-repression-action" theory because the Spanish state responded to the killings with a heavy hand. Constitutional guarantees were suspended in Gipuzkoa and arrests nearly decimated ETA's cadres by the end of 1969 (Muro 2008: 106). The infamous Burgos trial in 1970, in which 16 ETA militants were accused of acts of terrorism and banditry, was supposed to act as a deterrent for potential ETA recruits. Luckily for ETA, it had the unintended consequence of granting legitimacy to the armed group in the eyes of large sectors of the Spanish opposition as the vanguard of resistance against a brutal Franco regime (Muro 2008: 107). In the aftermath of the trial, ETA was flooded with new members from the disaffected youth wing of the PNV and gained the support of the wider Basque nationalist community (Clark 1984: 155). Following this wave of support, ETA carried out its most spectacular action to date: the assassination of Franco's heir and prime minister, Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco, in 1973.

While there are no survey data to draw upon during the 1970 to 1974 period, it was clearly a high point for ETA in terms of mass support. Support for ETA was buoyed by the fact that PNV leaders remained in exile and their ability to pursue change through political institutions was blocked by the Francoist state apparatus. As one follower of Basque politics has put it: "ETA was the champion of Basque grievances" (Muro 2008: 110).

After Blanco's death, it was apparent to most reformists within the Franco regime that relaxing societal repression and allowing for some political contestation was necessary because the opposition was becoming too strong. Accordingly, new Prime Minister Arias Navarro proposed a programme for opening up the system in early 1974 that included elections for local governing positions and an increase in the percentage of elected deputies in the congress, albeit with very limited suffrage (Preston 1986: 57). Nevertheless, Spain's eventual transition to democracy was not a given at this point because the extreme right remained committed to fighting democracy, and kept firm control over key institutions such as the army and police. Within this highly uncertain context, a pertinent division within ETA came to the fore: the nationalists and the Marxists. The nationalist faction within ETA believed that Basque liberation would only come about through an all-out military struggle, while the then dominant Marxist

branch felt it was necessary to combine political work with the armed struggle, leading to the split of ETA into ETA-military (ETA-m) and ETA-politico-militar (ETA-pm). ETA-pm leaders were convinced that a political organization was necessary if ETA was to compete for support with the PNV in the post-Franco period. There was a genuine reason for this concern: PNV leaders took advantage of the opening in the authoritarian regime to reconstruct its organizational capacity and vie for popular support (Sullivan 1988: 151).

Ambiguity about Spain's political future all but ended in November 1976 when the opposition, reformists and the extreme right voted for Adolfo Suárez's proposal that dissolved the Francoist governing institutions and called for the election of a new democratic bicameral legislature. Certainly anticipating the coming political changes, ETA-pm designed a platform in 1976 that included the dissolution of military operations once its political organizations gained strength. ETA-pm spawned a number of new organizations to pursue its goals through non-violent means that eventually coalesced as the political party Euskadiko Ezkerra (Basque Left – EE). On the other hand, ETA-m developed a manifesto that recognized the importance of mass organizations to harness support for the independence movement, but stressed that the leadership of ETA-m maintain autonomy from the popular movement to ensure it had freedom to apply violence against the Spanish state in pursuit of its goals (Llera et al. 1993: 17–18). Organizations in favour of the armed solution led by ETA-m formed the political coalition Herri Batasuna (Popular Unity – HB) in 1978.

Despite their common agenda, ETA-m and ETA-pm pursued a bitter rivalry with each other and the PNV during the transitional period. ETA-pm rejected the offer from Suárez's transitional government to amnesty political prisoners except for those accused of the most serious attacks, whereas ETA-pm was willing to accept it as an appropriate measure. ETA-m believed that the political reforms made by Suárez were a façade for continued authoritarianism while ETA-pm interpreted these changes as a signal that the time had come to end the armed struggle (Llera et al. 1993: 119–120). Despite its rejection of the 1978 Constitution as illegitimate, the PNV accepted the Basque Statute of Autonomy and, in the referendum on its ratification, mobilized its supporters in favour of it. The EE also openly supported the statute, which indicated that ETA-pm was on board with the project as well. Only HB – the political wing of ETA-m – advocated a "no" vote, and, with only 5 per cent voting against the statute, it was overwhelmingly clear that the ETA-m and HB did not represent the majority Basque opinion. As its legitimacy dwindled, ETA-m became more violent. From 1975 until 1977, ETA-m killed approximately 43 people, but this number increased dramatically to 241 between 1978 and 1980 period (Martinez-Herrera 2002: 10). ETA-pm was dissolved in 1981 and ETA-m retained the name ETA. Since that time, ETA's militant activities have steadily declined and the percentage of Basques who "totally reject" ETA and the use of violence has increased dramatically (Llera 2005).

Democratization in Spain was a significant cause of the split in the main organization representing Basque grievances during the late authoritarian period.

Open elections and decentralization that empowered the Basque Country with an autonomous government legitimized the political programme of the PNV at the expense of ETA-m and ETA-pm. The opportunity to participate in political institutions also drew ETA-pm away from clandestine activity, leaving ETA-m with a dearth of support from within the nationalist community. From this standpoint, it appears that violence was a strategic move on the part of ETA-m to remain a relevant force and elevate the status of its members to that of martyrs making the highest sacrifice for the Basque nation. In doing so, ETA-m (ETA after 1981) hoped it could solidify its support base and continue to attract new recruits. In the two decades since, the PNV has tried both isolating and coalescing with the radical nationalist movement, and neither strategy has succeeded in fully eradicating ETA. In early 2011, ETA declared a permanent ceasefire, but refused to fully disband. It remains possible, then, that internal strife or new competing organizations entering Basque politics somewhere in between the PNV and HB on the nationalist continuum could trigger a surge in violent activity.

## Acehnese (Indonesia)

The Acehnese rebelled against the Indonesian state following repeated failures to address regionalist demands. The conflict suffered three periods of violent clashes between local organizations and the Indonesian military. First, under the banner of the Darul Islam rebellion (1953–1957), an Acehnese group fought alongside rebels from other regions with the objective of establishing an Islamic state in Indonesia. This rebellion was partly due to regionalist grievances against the Indonesian government, which had withdrawn Aceh's status as a province in 1950. Second, a more long-lasting rebellion emerged after 1976 during the authoritarian rule of President Suharto (1965–1998). The Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (Free Aceh Movement – GAM) mobilized violently in 1976 and then again in 1989 but was crushed both times. Finally, after the fall of the Suharto regime in 1998, GAM re-emerged, this time better organized and more powerful, but it also briefly shared the political field with moderates. This most violent and long-lasting episode of Acehnese rebellion against the Indonesian state occurred after the beginning of democratization, yet it was also during that phase that several organizations were formed and competed for support.

GAM mobilized violently in 1976 as it sought an independent country in response to the Indonesian state's centralization and lack of redistribution of revenues from recently discovered gas and oil reserves in the province. During this phase, GAM was a relatively small and weak group with little popular support (Morris 1983). It was easily defeated by the Indonesian armed forces. Similarly, its re-emergence in 1989, although slightly stronger, had been crushed by 1991 (Kell 1995). For most of the following decade there was no evidence of a violent conflict. The province, however, was kept under tight repression, having been declared a Daerah Operasi Militer (Military Operations Zone – DOM). The military undertook violent repressive measures and operations to weed out GAM supporters, but GAM was unable to mount any significant attacks in response.

Nevertheless, it continued to organize silently among villagers. During this period, GAM became a symbol of resistance, and its support grew steadily as the broader population resented the military's harsh treatment.[1]

When the authoritarian regime fell in 1998 and democratization began, the moderate centre seized the opportunity to mobilize peacefully. Student groups and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were formed around two main issues: justice for the abuses by the armed forces during the DOM period and a referendum on wide-ranging autonomy. Most notably, after President Habibie conceded to a referendum for East Timor in February 1999, demands for a referendum grew steadily stronger in Aceh. An umbrella organization was formed specifically to mobilize in favour of a referendum: the Sentral Informasi Referendum Aceh (Referendum Information Centre – SIRA). SIRA successfully organized two large demonstrations demanding a referendum on autonomy or independence. The first, in November 1999, drew an estimated 500,000 people. The following year, despite government efforts to restrict access to Banda Aceh, 400,000 people were able to demonstrate again in support of a referendum.[2] SIRA represented a moderate alternative, and clearly gained broad support among Acehnese.

In the meantime, GAM re-emerged with greater strength and support than ever before. It first organized a vast campaign by which it made frequent state-ments denouncing the military's past abuses, thereby strengthening its position as representative of a new Aceh in opposition to the abusive Indonesian state. Since the Habibie government appeared reluctant to make any significant con-cessions to Aceh or hold a referendum, GAM began new attacks on military targets. The violence escalated dramatically in 2000 as the military launched intensive operations. Most Acehnese had suffered considerably from military repression prior to 1998. As the military escalated its response, so did Acehnese support for GAM.

Because of the re-escalation of violent conflict, the civilian movement was increasingly eclipsed. Yet, there seemed to have been a distant coordination in tactics between GAM and SIRA. While SIRA pushed for a referendum in the early months of the democratization period, GAM adopted a "wait-and-see" approach while it reorganized and sought more weapons. There were communi-cations between GAM and SIRA, as they shared the same objectives of inde-pendence or wide-ranging autonomy. Even though there was no systematic coordination of strategies, nevertheless they did align themselves with each other and were not competitive organizations.[3]

SIRA and GAM were able to lead the Acehnese because alternative groups were discredited. For a brief time, religious leaders (ulama) attempted to occupy a leadership role as they once had under the very popular leadership of Daud Beureueh, a prominent ulama and first governor of Aceh after Indonesia's inde-pendence. They reorganized politically as a misguided President Habibie, in the first few months after the fall of Suharto, attempted to address grievances in Aceh by sponsoring the adoption of Islamic law in the province. Law no. 44 (1999) extended Islamic Law to Aceh in a broad number of areas. It was

believed that this law might give more power to the ulama and undermine GAM's leadership role, since GAM had always been a secular movement with uneasy ties to Islamic leadership. Many of the local ulama distanced themselves from this attempt to solve the Acehnese problem. An attempt to reorganize ulama politically, through the creation of the Association of Traditional Aceh-nese Ulama (HUDA) in 1999, also failed. HUDA took on a leadership role to organize an Acehnese Peoples' Congress in 1999. Yet, it faced harsh criticism from GAM and civil society activists. Under attack from all sides during its attempt to assume a new leadership role, it withdrew from the organizing com-mittee of the Congress and left the political realm. The ulama had long lost a political leadership role in Acehnese society, and these events only confirmed that they could not reassert such a role (McGibbon 2006: 332–335).

With democratization, an alternative set of political channels could have opened and supported a group of moderate representatives. Indeed, a broad number of middle-class Acehnese in universities, government positions and large businesses were more strongly opposed to independence and favoured, instead, some form of autonomy. Yet, this group of technocrats and middle-class Acehnese had few supporters among the broader population as their association with the Suharto regime had largely discredited them. While some academics from Syiah Kuala University attempted to position themselves within the rising constellation of human rights organizations, nevertheless a vast majority of this group was ultimately seen as having been complicit with the repression of the 1990s.

For 20 years, the New Order regime nurtured the rise of a technocratic class, which thrived in Jakarta and became an active lobby group between the local provincial government and the Suharto regime. It largely displaced the previ-ously influential group of ulama which enjoyed vast support and led Aceh fol-lowing independence and the period of the Darul Islam rebellion in the 1950s (Kell 1995). During the DOM period, it remained close to the central govern-ment and was considered to be, at the very least, a silent partner of the regime.

It was difficult, therefore, to reposition itself after 1998 and assume a leader-ship role (McGibbon 2006). As part of this technocratic class, the local govern-ment was also unable to take on a new leadership role. When democratization occurred, all of the national and provincial parliamentary representatives remained in place, as well as the provincial governors. Appointed by the central government, these governors were essentially tasked with implementing central government policies and were cut off from the masses. National political parties tightly controlled elections to provincial assemblies under the purview of the government in Jakarta. As a result, the local government and parliamentarians remained illegitimate until some alternative form of governance could be put in place. This left a leadership vacuum that was subsequently filled by SIRA and GAM (McGibbon 2006).

The governor of Aceh, Syamsuddin Mahmud, and some local representatives did attempt to award themselves a new leadership role by proposing to the national parliament a draft bill on autonomy for Aceh. At the same time, a small

group of Jakarta-based Acehnese, who had distanced themselves from their previous technocratic elders but who nevertheless enjoyed some rising influence, particularly with their association with newly established political parties, such as the National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional – PAN), also seized the initiative to propose a new political arrangement for Aceh. The product of these initiatives led to the special autonomy law of 2001. The law came too late, however, and was largely overshadowed by the rising violence and GAM's role in the province (Bertrand 2004; McGibbon 2006).

Violent conflict in Aceh therefore followed an unexpected pattern following democratization. Initially there was an increase in protests and demonstrations, as exemplified by the rise of critical human rights organizations and particularly SIRA's referendum campaign. The inability of SIRA, a large umbrella organization of student and youth groups, however, to provide a more sustained and organized leadership role beyond its very successful demonstrations paved the way for GAM to position itself as the main representative. With its long struggle against the Indonesian state, it could successfully occupy this leadership role by mounting its own campaign of accusations and denunciations against the Indonesian state, while it reorganized militarily. Having some linkage to SIRA, it maintained a lower profile to observe whether the referendum campaign might yield results. Since it failed, and the Indonesian government and military clearly refused to negotiate, GAM became the dominant organization as violence re-escalated in subsequent years. It could also do so as the ulama proved a spent force, while the technocrats and existing provincial government representatives were largely discredited.

While the end-story was generally positive for Acehnese, it came at great costs. Following a peace agreement in 2005, GAM reintegrated the political sphere. A new Law on Governing Aceh (2006) gave broad and substantive autonomy that resulted from negotiations between GAM and the Indonesian government. GAM leaders ran in elections for governor and local elections, and GAM also formed a political party. The province held elections in 2006 and then in 2011 to 2012. While the democratization eventually produced a better outcome for Acehnese, and an elimination of the armed resistance movement, nevertheless the first few years saw a dramatic rise in violence, and an escalation between GAM and the armed forces as moderate Acehnese organizations were sidelined.

## Diola (Senegal)

The Diola in southern Senegal have expressed separatist sentiments since colonial times. Due to its geographic separation from the northern part of Senegal, the Diola and other indigenous groups in the Casamance region were able to maintain their own languages and religion.[4] The Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (MFDC) was founded in 1947 not as a separatist rebel organization, but as a political party standing for Casamance interests. Following independence from France, the MFDC was absorbed into the single party state of President Léopold Senghor and remained quiescent for two decades.

It has been said that President Senghor promised to review the status of Casamance and the terms of its inclusion in the Senegalese state 20 years after independence in 1962. The first major demonstration of the reconstituted MFDC occurred in the regional capital of Ziguinchor on 26 December 1982, the timing clearly linked to this promise. It is estimated that anywhere from 1,000 to 100,000 Diola took to the streets and replaced Senegalese flags with a new flag symbolizing Casamance independence (Woocher 2000: 345). The literature distributed by the MFDC called on all inhabitants of the Casamance to fight for independence because repeated good faith attempts to co-exist with the Senegalese state had resulted in the economic, social and cultural deterioration of the Casamance region. Senegalese elites denounced this rhetoric, claiming that Casamance intellectuals were exploiting the situation to develop an autochthonous identity that could be mobilized for their own purposes (Thiam 1984). Violence between MFDC members and state military forces occurred sporadically throughout 1983, causing approximately 25 deaths. The Senegalese military was subsequently deployed in the Casamance region and given much leeway to arbitrarily arrest potential rebels and supporters of the MFDC (Woocher 2000: 356).

Senegal's imperfect democracy under Abdou Diouf operated with very restricted political competition and limited protection of civil liberties during the 1980s. Dakar accorded special attention to the Casamance region because of its restive nature and instituted a system of "quasi-martial law" as a means to root out the separatist problem (Manley 1998). Facing a repressive state, some members of the MFDC organized in 1985 a guerrilla group under the name Attika that would function as the military wing of the MFDC. To some extent, however, the formation of Attika was a consequence of changing leadership within the MFDC. Political ideologues behind the re-emergence of the MFDC, such as Diamacoune Senghor, had been arrested during the skirmishes in 1983, and veterans of the French and Senegalese armies that favoured a military approach took charge of the organization (Foucher 2007: 177). Attika remained hidden in the dense forests of the lower Casamance, training and collecting weapons until clashes with security forces began to escalate in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Attika primarily attacked military targets, but also civilians who were known to collaborate with Senegalese authorities. In retaliation, the army responded by arresting, torturing and executing hundreds of Diola for sympathizing with the separatist cause (Amnesty International 1998).

A first ceasefire agreement was negotiated between the MFDC and the Senegalese government in 1991; Sidy Badji, Commander of Attika and the Senegalese Defence Minister in Guinea-Bissau, signed it on 31 May.[5] This was followed by a second round of negotiations aimed at consolidating the ceasefire, resulting in the Cacheu Accords in 1992. These negotiations intensified a rivalry that was developing within the MFDC between Senghor and Badji. Senghor criticized the Cacheu Accords for not addressing the critical issue of Casamance independence, while Badji advocated that working towards peace from within various structures of the state should be the new mission of the MFDC (Diaw

and Diouf 1998: 280). This resulted in a bitter split within the MFDC, as Senghor and his followers affirmed their commitment to fighting for independence as the Southern Front and Badji's followers regrouped as the Northern Front. Although the Northern Front did not disarm, it rarely used violence in the 1990s and was active in helping with the economic development of the Casamance region.

Even though the gradual process of democratization began in 1978, the 1993 presidential elections marked the first time that the electorate voted in a genuinely competitive election. The Southern Front denounced the elections because of Diouf's firm stance on an indivisible Senegalese nation, and declared that anyone in the Casamance in possession of polling cards would be considered traitors. The Southern Front violently persecuted voters and set up landmines to prevent people from getting to the polls (Hall 1999: 16). The Southern Front also displayed its impressive military capacity by blowing up an International Committee of the Red Cross vehicle and launching a rocket attack on Ziguinchor Airport. Despite their best efforts, the Southern Front were not able to prevent more than 40 per cent of voters in the Casamance from turning out to the polls, only 10 per cent less than the national rate (Faye 2006: 38). The elections were followed by a short lull in conflict, but violence picked up again in 1995 after a major offensive by the Senegalese army. Weakened by the offensive, the Southern Front took part in dialogue with the government in late 1995, but were not genuinely interested in peace. The Southern Front most likely used the time to ready themselves for further combat. In 1997, the organization killed 25 Senegalese soldiers in an ambush attack, the army's most significant loss in a single attack to date (Faye 2006: 39).

The split of the MFDC into the Southern and Northern fronts changed the MFDC's relationship with the local constituency in the Casamance. Throughout the 1990s, tensions between Senegal and The Gambia and Guinea-Bissau, as well as ethnic ties between political elites in The Gambia and the Southern Front, created an ideal situation for the Southern Front to procure arms and set up bases outside Senegalese borders. Its decreased reliance on local populations for monetary and logistical support allowed the Southern Front the liberty to pursue indiscriminate attacks – of which they took full advantage – that put local civilians at risk. Furthermore, the offensive launched by the Senegalese army forced the Southern Front to flee into territory occupied by the Northern Front, spreading violence into a region north of the Casamance River that had been peaceful since the Northern Front decided to cooperate with the Senegalese state. The Southern Front terrorized "traitors" in Northern Casamance villages, forcing them to provide food and money against their will, and killing those who did not cooperate (Amnesty International 1998). Popular support for the Southern Front was eroded. By the end of 1990s, it operated in virtual isolation from its constituency, as most civilians in the Casamance were persuaded by Dakar's promise of peace and economic development in exchange for denunciation of the armed struggle.

Democracy in Senegal took a major step forward in 2000 when the opposition leader Abdoulaye Wade toppled the incumbent Diouf who had remained in

power for nearly two decades amidst accusations of corruption and election rigging. Upon accession, Wade declared that solving the Casamance conflict was a top priority. His commitment to a democratic solution was popular among war-weary Casamance civilians and some members of both fronts of the MFDC. Senghor, who a decade before had declined to negotiate with the government, led a significant portion of both fronts into a peace deal which set an agenda for future talks concerning Casamance autonomy in 2004. By this time, however, both fronts of the MFDC had split into several rogue groups, and the decision by Senghor and other political figures in the MFDC to work with Wade exacerbated these fissures. Isolated from external support and their domestic constituencies, both fronts of the MFDC became profit-driven bandits that used violence as means to secure natural resources. While the moderates in both fronts joined forces to negotiate with the government, those opposing the peace initiatives fragmented into even smaller competitive units that occupy resource-rich areas. For the most part, the remaining 2,000 to 4,000 rebels are unskilled men with no job prospects that are driven by greed rather than nationalism (Faye 2006: 50). The surges in violence in the Casamance since 2004 have frequently been due to clashes between factions of the MFDC over resources rather than separatist violence per se (United Nations 2006).

There was no clear moment of democratization in Senegal, but increasing opportunities to engage with the political process altered the structure of the MFDC. Diouf's conciliatory gestures within a democratic framework isolated the Southern Front from the Casamance people and the Northern Front. This weak position provided the impetus for the Southern Front to start terrorizing those it purported to represent and thereby provided some legitimacy to the heavy-handed repression applied by Dakar. The deepening of democracy finally convinced the remaining ideologues within the MFDC ranks that the political option is superior and more in line with the opinion of their war-weary constituency. It seems that the only reason violence is ongoing is because the exploitable resources in the Casamance region have turned the separatist war into a war of greed.

### Moros (Philippines)

The Moros have rebelled actively against the Philippine state since the 1970s. There is a long history of resistance to integration, stretching back as far as the Spanish and American colonial occupations, interrupted by periods of accommodation and cooperation. The resistance is rooted in discriminatory policies of the Philippine state against its minority Muslim Moro population. Muslim Moros have resented the dominance of state and regional institutions by Christian Filipinos, inadequate socio-economic development opportunities, past injustices relating to land acquisition and migration of Christians to Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago, as well as failures to implement adequately alternative political solutions such as autonomy.

During the authoritarian regime of President Marcos, which lasted from 1972 to 1986,[6] the Moros united under the banner of the Moro National Liberation

Front (MNLF). Led by the former University of the Philippines professor Nur Misuari, the MNLF and its armed wing, the Bangsamoro Army, were created in 1972, leading to the dissolution of previous organizations representing the Moros, such as the Mindanao Independence Movement (MIM). The MNLF enjoyed a dominant position as representative of the Moro, since it mounted fierce resistance to the Philippine army for the subsequent four years. It also obtained support from the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), Libya and Malaysia. Under international pressure and mounting casualties, the Marcos regime agreed to talks that led to the signing of the Tripoli Agreement of 1976, which became the landmark agreement offering autonomy to Muslims in 13 provinces and nine cities of Mindanao. The agreement was never implemented but it set a benchmark for future negotiations.

A more immediate impact of the 1976 agreement was a splintering of the MNLF. Under Misuari, the MNLF had adopted a nationalist rhetoric instead of an Islamic discourse. Furthermore, Misuari and intellectuals behind the MNLF were highly influenced by Marxist ideology, which had been strong on university campuses in this period (McKenna 1998: 41). Although the MNLF enjoyed very broad support in the early years of its formation, it was unable to dominate the elite. One splinter group was the traditional elite of local *datus*. Many of these traditional leaders had long cooperated with the Philippine state, and had been integrated to national political institutions as congressional representatives or provincial administrators as early as the period of American occupation. Although a small number of mainly young datus joined and supported the MNLF early on, several influential datus chose to support the martial law state. A few datus formed the Bangsa Moro Liberation Organization, but it enjoyed little support among Moros and dissolved a few years later after its leaders returned to Mindanao to rejoin the government (McKenna 1998: 161–162). Some rebel commanders surrendered to the government immediately before and after the Tripoli agreement, enticed by cash payments and government positions. Another faction of the MNLF, led by vice-chairman Hashim Salamat, challenged Nur Misuari for the leadership of the organization and offered, instead, an alternative direction based on Islam. The rift was exposed in 1977 after the failure of talks on implementing the Tripoli agreement; by 1980 Salamat had moved his faction to Pakistan. In 1984, he created the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) with a more explicit emphasis on Islam rather than nationalism that was previously espoused by the MNLF under Nur Misuari. In terms of its political goals, however, the MILF differed little from the MNLF (McKenna 1998: 207–208). Ethnic affiliations nevertheless constituted an additional layer of differentiation. While the MNLF maintained a stronger base among Tausugs in the Sulu archipelago, the MILF enjoyed greater support among the Maguindanao and Maranao of central Mindanao.

Consequently, at the time of the People Power revolution in 1986 which marked the beginning of democratization in the Philippines, there were two competing Moro organizations, both choosing armed resistance to the Philippine state and sharing goals of secession or autonomy for Muslim Mindanao. The

government of Corazon Aquino, under pressure to negotiate a settlement in the wake of new constitutional provisions for autonomy, opened negotiations only with the MNLF. Yet, the MNLF had been severely weakened by the intensive war in the 1970s, from which it had never recovered, as well as by defections of commanders and soldiers to the government following the failure of the Tripoli agreement and the enticement of traditional datu leaders. Meanwhile, still a representative of the Moro. In spite of its attempts to create more linkages to Arab and other Muslim states, it failed to obtain recognition from the OIC, which continued to recognize the MNLF as the sole representative of the Moro people. As the signatory of the Tripoli agreement and beneficiary of more media attention, the MNLF enjoyed a unique position to negotiate with the Aquino government, in spite of its dwindling support. In response, the MILF, also seeking national recognition, staged a large demonstration that drew between 50,000 and 100,000 in Cotabato city, the heartland of MILF support at the time, but these events went almost unnoticed. As a result, the Aquino government negotiated only with the MNLF. Furthermore, the MILF strongly objected to a planned constitutional provision for autonomy in "Muslim Mindanao", thus moving away from the 13 provinces and nine cities agreed in the Tripoli agreement. When the Aquino government began negotiations with the MNLF, the MILF launched attacks against several government targets, forcing Aquino to meet and discuss a ceasefire (McKenna 1998: 244–246).

Violence continued and intensified more than a decade after democratization partly because of the continued split and competition between the two organizations. The MILF launched occasional attacks against government positions, while remaining unwilling (or unable) to sustain a much larger campaign against the Philippine armed forces. The Aquino government persisted in negotiating with the MNLF, with the expectation that an agreement would unify the Moros. President Ramos continued negotiations with the same assumption following his election in 1992. A breakthrough occurred in 1996 and a comprehensive peace agreement was signed between the MNLF and the Philippine government. Because of the agreement, several of the MNLF soldiers were retained to be included into the local police or the military, while others were given compensation to reintegrate into society. The MNLF leadership was offered opportunities to govern the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao, which had been created by an Act of Congress during the Aquino administration. Nur Misuari was elected head of the ARMM government and was head of the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD), which was created to oversee development projects in the 13 provinces and nine cities of the Tripoli agreement. These measures were deemed temporary while they awaited a referendum on the expansion and revamping of the autonomous region. These plans were derailed in subsequent years, partly because of the discrediting of Nur Misuari's leadership of the ARMM, but also because of the strong alternative offered by the MILF (Bertrand 2000).

During negotiations between the MNLF and the government of the Philippines, the MILF had quietly been building up its strength. By 1996 it had a force of 12,000 combatants in 13 camps and a large number of other enclaves (Bacani 2005: 5). It rejected the peace agreement with the MNLF, since it considered that it had failed to address a number of issues such as the protection of ancestral domain. Although the MILF continued to present a position in favour of independence, it was actually ready to negotiate. Ceasefire agreements were reached between the Ramos administration and the MILF as soon as 1997, and discussions were initiated for rounds of negotiation. In subsequent years, as the ARMM and SPCPD under MNLF leadership became discredited, the MILF gained greater mass support in all regions. Violence increased very significantly in 2000 owing to the continued failure of the Philippine government to convince the MILF to accept the 1996 peace agreement and the MILF's continued ability to wage attacks against the Philippine army. Frustration drove President Estrada's decision to wage an all-out war against the MILF in 2000.

Meanwhile, alternative groups also sought to compete for support but were relatively weak. The Abu Sayaff, created in 1991, remained a fringe group with minimal support primarily in the island of Basilan. Although it successfully gained attention through a few attacks and kidnappings, it never gained broader support. Eventually it became more a criminal than a political organization. More significantly, traditional datus as well as family clans occupied most of the positions in the provincial and municipal governments of the Sulu archipelago and central Mindanao, as well as some representation as congressional representatives. After democratization their numbers and influence increased, but continued corruption and lack of development severely limited their support among the broader Muslim population. While the latter had previously shifted much of its support to the MNLF, growing numbers now supported the MILF rather than actually supporting either the new MNLF-controlled ARMM government or traditional politicians. Between 1996 and 2012, the MILF became increasingly relevant. Successive negotiations mainly led to ceasefires and little progress, although a new agreement under President Benigno Aquino (Jr) appeared at the time of writing to offer new hope.

Competition between two armed organizations with similar objectives contributed significantly to the continuance and subsequent rise of violence in Muslim areas of the Philippines. Attempts by the Philippine government to ignore the MILF and negotiate only with the MNLF failed to create a moderate centre around the 1996 peace agreement that could sway the Moros in favour of peace. Instead, the MILF offered an increasingly strong alternative that challenged the MNLF's position because the Moros saw little improvement from the MNLF–Philippines government peace agreement.

### Miskitos (Nicaragua)

The Atlantic Coast of Nicaragua is home to several indigenous groups, of which the Miskito Indians are the largest.[7] Throughout the colonial period, the Miskitos

successfully resisted Spanish colonization with the aid of the British. The British had an interest in maintaining a trade alliance with the Miskitos, but not directly administering the territory. Its status as a British protectorate allowed the Miskitos to to use their native language and practise their customs with minimal interference from the Nicaraguan state until the mid-nineteenth century. Britain and the United States finally recognized Nicaragua's sovereignty over the territory in 1860. Repeated attempts by the newly independent Nicaraguan state to integrate the Miskitos into the Nicaraguan nation were unsuccessful owing to the marked ethnic and cultural differences between the dominant mestizos and Miskitos, as well as the strong remaining British influence (Sánchez 2007: 10–11). This period of relative freedom from foreign interference ended for Nicaragua in 1912 when the United States began another occupation of the country, which once again provided the indigenes of the Atlantic Coast with relative autonomy.

As the United States began to withdraw, Nicaraguan military commander Anastasio Somoza García consolidated his power. He was inaugurated as President on 1 January 1937, thus beginning the lengthiest dynastic dictatorship in the history of Latin America. The Somoza regime took a primarily economic interest in the Atlantic Coast region. The regime built infrastructure and financed many development projects in the 1950s and 1960s in an attempt to both modernize the Atlantic Coast and exploit its abundant natural resources for the benefit of the Nicaraguan state (Vilas 1989: 68–70). This intrusion did aggravate feelings of resentment among Miskitos because many of the projects involved the expropriation of Indian communal lands; Miskitos organized to stop these incursions. They tried to petition the "Somocista" state through the minimal political channels that were available, but they also burned tracts of forest to prevent the state from taking their pinewood and lands (Ortiz 1988: 6).

There is disagreement in the literature as to what extent Miskitos and other indigenes were the victims of cultural oppression under the Somozas. Cleary (2000) and Ortega (1991) argue that the Somocista state made no attempt to assimilate the Miskitos into the Nicaraguan national identity, while Vilas (1989) and Ortiz (1988) are sceptical of this view and suggest that the regime did make at least a tacit attempt to pursue homogenization. Nevertheless, the emergence of ALPROMISU (Alliance for Progress of Miskitos and Sumus) in 1974 indicates that an ethnic movement was manifesting on the Atlantic Coast.[8] The stated goals of ALPROMISU quickly changed from those of a socioeconomic nature to explicitly cultural ones and it attracted support from all over the northeast region of the Atlantic Coast (Hale 1994: 127). The Somoza regime did accept ALPROMISU demands to participate in local government and offered the organization a seat in the national Congress, but kept a close eye on its activities.

The Miskitos were insulated from the Sandinista revolution that swept away the Somoza regime. Few, if any, Miskitos took part in the revolution or had any association with the Sandinistas. Consequently, the revolutionaries were ignorant of the cultural differences separating the Atlantic and Pacific Coasts, and treated indigenes as economically backward and exploited peoples who would benefit from the FSLN programme of national liberation and social emancipation.

The revolutionary viewpoint was expressed in a Declaration in 1981 that affirmed the "territorial unity and political unity of the Nicaraguan nation" (Vilas 1989: 107). The Sandinista leadership believed in a top-down approach to politics, but did allow some participation in decision-making bodies such as the council of state to grassroots organizations representing various interests such as women, youth and rural workers. Because of its commitment to national unity, the revolutionary government was at first opposed to ALPROMISU participation in the council of state, but decided to grant it a seat in 1980 under condition that the organization recognized the principles of the revolution. The successor of ALPROMISU – MISURASATA (Miskitos, Sumus, Ramas, and Sandinistas Working Together) – worked from within the Sandinista institutions in 1980 to promote Indians' demands. Initially, MISURASATA shared the revolutionary viewpoint and pursued modest indigenous rights such as the right to land, education and culture, but its demands soon escalated. MISURASATA argued that the formation of the Nicaraguan nation-state came after the formation of Indian nations. This manifested into a demand for outright independence for a territory that made up over one-third of the Nicaraguan state. The radicalization of MISURASATA's demands heightened tensions between the organization and the Sandinistas.

The fact that the US provided support to MISURASATA because it associated the organization with the broader anti-Sandinista movement was not the main reason that the conflict became violent (Vilas 1989: 125). The leaders of MISURASATA effectively built on pre-existing communal and religious structures in Miskito communities to garner an avalanche of popular support. As their social base grew, MISURASATA elites became increasingly confident that they could pursue a political programme centred on cultural and territorial demands in direct defiance of the Sandinistas (Hale 1987: 108). The threat MISURASATA posed to Nicaraguan sovereignty became too serious, and the Sandinistas arrested around 24 MISURASATA leaders in early 1981. Within days, thousands of Miskitos had crossed the Honduras border to prepare for war with the Sandinistas. Stedman Fagoth, the leading figure in MISURASATA, drew upon the support base of the organization to form the armed group MISURA (Miskitos, Sumus, Ramas). The new MISURASATA leader, Brooklyn Rivera, supported a less intransigent position that centred on continuing cooperation with the Sandinistas.[9] He ended up leaving Nicaragua in late 1981 after deciding that the political alternative had no popular support and little future (Hale 1987: 111).

The intense Miskito rebellion that lasted until mid-1984 began in December 1981 when MISURA insurgents conducted a series of offensives, killing 60 people associated with the Sandinistas. The government responded by evacuating Miskitos from the Rio Coco region along the Honduras border to use as a base to wage its counter-attack. In doing so, the Sandinistas increased the generalized resentment towards the state among Miskitos and drove them to support MISURA unequivocally (Hale 1987: 112).

In the midst of the simultaneous wars with the Contras and MISURA, the revolutionaries moved from a transitional government to holding open elections. The council of state passed an electoral law modelled on West European practices in 1983, which led to a national election in 1984. International observers noted that the election of FSLN candidate Jose Daniel Ortega Saavedra to the presidency and a FSLN majority to the national assembly was the result of a legitimately open electoral contest (Walker 1997: 10).

The position of the Sandinista government towards the Atlantic Coast changed dramatically during the democratization process. A new indigenous organization – MISATAN (United Miskito People of Nicaragua) – formed in 1984 with the support of the government. It was hoped that MISATAN could act as an interlocutor between the Miskitos and the government, but its leadership could not establish a broad support base among Miskitos owing to its ties to the FSLN (Vilas 1989: 158). The government also initiated conversations with MISURA and MISURASATA concerning issues such as autonomy, natural resources, welfare and cultural rights. These discussions revealed that the goals of both MISURA and MISURASATA were nearly identical – autonomy with constitutional recognition of Indian nations – but the rivalry between Fagoth and Rivera prevented the unification of the organizations (Garcia 1996: 110). Counter-revolutionary leaders and the US government tried to integrate MISURASATA and MISURA into a new organization, Asla (Unity), but MISURA hardliners quickly dissolved Asla and created a new organization, KISAN (Union of Coast Indians in Nicaragua), which was committed to continuing the war against the Nicaraguan government. Fagoth and Rivera were in opposition to KISAN, and competition between MISURASATA, MISURA, KISAN and MISATAN for exclusive rights to representation of the Miskito people made it difficult for autonomy negotiations to continue. Armed conflict between MISURASATA and MISURA and the Sandinistas decreased after mid-1984, although minor violations of various ceasefire accords were reported (Butler 1997: 221–222).

Representatives of MISURASATA, MISURA, KISAN and MISATAN took part in the ongoing autonomy discussions that started in 1984 with the formation of the national autonomy commission by the FSLN. Although there was opposition from within the armed organizations and MISATAN, no one made a serious effort to derail the autonomy process. The national assembly approved the autonomy statute for the regions of the Atlantic Coast of Nicaragua in September 1987 with the intention of empowering regional governments to execute policies that would cater to the interests of the various indigenous communities of the Atlantic Coast. Moreover, Nicaragua's new Constitution promulgated immediately prior to the autonomy law declared, "the Nicaraguan people are multiethnic", marking the end of the Nicaraguan nation-state project. These concessions led to a shift in mobilization strategy from violence to politics by the major organizations. There were small factions within all the organizations that opposed autonomy, but fighting between Sandinista troops and MISURASATA, MISURA and KISAN petered out in the late 1980s.

Since the defeat of the FSLN government in the 1990 elections, Miskito and other indigenous leaders have experienced some setbacks and victories as they attempt to consolidate the powers invested in the two Atlantic Coast regional

governments. The neoliberal governments led by the National Opposition Union in 1990, the Liberal Alliance in 1996 and the Constitutionalist Liberal Party in 2001 have all been wary of losing control of the resource-rich Atlantic Coast, but over time have shown a greater willingness to respect the spirit and letter of the autonomy statute. The re-election of Ortega and FSLN's victory in the national assembly elections in 2006 bode well for autonomy because the FSLN initiated the project and its members were critical of the neoliberal governments' attempts to undermine it.

The various Miskito armed groups unified in 1987 under the name YATAMA (Sons of Mother Earth) and officially converted to a political organization in 1990 to contest in the first regional elections. The unification put an end to the hostilities between Fagoth and Rivera and re-established a degree of coherence to the Miskito movement, much like MISURASATA did during the Somoza and early Sandinista periods. YATAMA had its best results in 1990, winning 22 of 45 seats in the North Atlantic Autonomous Region (RAAN) and four seats out of 45 in the South Atlantic Autonomous Region (RAAS). YATAMA has been involved in the organization of large protests and seizures of government property in recent years, but there is no indication that a return to guerrilla activity will occur unless the central government seriously undermines autonomy.

## Papuans (Indonesia)

The converse of the Acehnese situation occurred in Papua. Because of the past inability of rebels to unite under one strong organization, moderates were able to occupy the leadership position in the aftermath of the democratic breakthrough. Furthermore, as their legitimacy grew among the broader population, they were able to convince armed groups to follow non-violent means of pursuing Papuan interests. In this case, therefore, a moderate organization dominated the post-democratization period, thereby significantly eliminating violence.

Papuans have resisted ever since they were integrated to Indonesia in 1969. The Dutch ceded West New Guinea to the UN in 1962 under international pressure, and with the promise of a UN-monitored referendum on its future status. In turn, the territory was granted temporarily to Indonesia in 1963 and, in 1969, the Indonesian government formally integrated it through a UN approved "Act of Free Choice" that was strongly contested for having been manipulated by the Indonesian government and held under a climate of intimidation and repression (Bertrand 2004: 144–160; Osborne 1985: 41–48). Since then, the Organisasi Papua Merdeka (Free Papua Movement – OPM) has been actively resisting the Indonesian state. Weak, divided and poorly organized, it mainly conducted small raids on military posts, police stations, or other government targets, but with little engagement with the armed forces. It was never able to mount a significant large-scale guerrilla movement. Nevertheless, it became the symbol of resistance to Indonesian rule.

The process of formal integration was not the only reason for resistance. Military operations to weed out the OPM affected civilians in many areas.

As reports of human rights abuses increased, the military diminished the scale of its responses but violence against civilians, torture, disappearances and shootings continued. In addition, migration, education and cultural policies by the state fostered assimilation. In the 1970s and 1980s, the government sponsored a trans-migration programme with the province, renamed Irian Jaya, as one of its important sites. Furthermore, it supported spontaneous migrants who arrived in much greater numbers. Education emphasized an Indonesian curriculum, with Bahasa Indonesia being the sole language of education. Papuans were also denied many of their cultural practices, often seen as subversive (Defert 1996).

When democratization began in 1998, the nationalist elite seized the opportunity to create a civilian movement. A group of 100 delegates representing all sectors of Papuan society met with President Habibie in 1999. They shocked him when one of their leaders blatantly denounced the 1969 Act of Free Choice as an illegitimate process and demanded independence. In subsequent months, a Papuan People's Congress was organized and its first meeting drew thousands of people from all sectors of Papuan society. A declaration supporting independence was adopted and a Presidium (PDP) was created as a representative of the Papuan people.

The PDP under the leadership of Theys Eluay soon gained ascendancy as a legitimate representative of Papuans, although it had no formal institutional recognition from the government. With strong popular support, it was able to convince OPM leaders to join them and mobilize peacefully for Papuan self-determination.[10] The transitional governments of Presidents Habibie and Wahid tolerated meetings of the Papuan People's Congress to take place and the PDP to be formed. Once demonstrations began to raise the Papuan independence flag, however, and as the congresses and PDP continued to press for independence, Wahid was formally reprimanded by the People's Consultative Assembly (the highest ranking legislative body in Indonesia) for allowing political activities in Papua that threatened national unity. Under pressure on these issues and struggling to maintain power, Wahid began to crack down on the PDP and the flag-raising incidents.

The crackdown on the PDP led to diluted and scattered political representation. The OPM did not significantly change its practices, although it continued some attacks, particularly on the border with Papua New Guinea. Nevertheless, it has not played a significant leadership role among the broader population in recent years. Other groups among civilians have chosen formal institutional channels. Following the 2000 crackdown, the government supported a special autonomy bill. Initiated by local Papuan bureaucrats and academics, the bill was wide-ranging and promised very significant autonomy, as well as provisions for a referendum (Bertrand 2004: 158–159). Its final form, which came into effect in early 2002, was highly diluted and contested from its inception by many NGOs, church groups and community leaders. It was particularly undermined by measures to divide Papua, leading to the creation of the province of West Irian Jaya in 2003. Since then, government positions at the provincial, district and sub-district level, as well as the newly created Papuan People's Assembly (MRP), have been

mostly Papuans, in sharp contrast with pre-democratization days when most of the positions were held by non-Papuans. As a result, these changes have created a divided, yet loyal, constituency supportive of special autonomy and reaping benefits from the resources made available under the law. The Dewan Adat Papua (Papua Traditional Council – DPA), on the other hand, held a symbolic ceremony in 2005 to "return" the special autonomy law to the central government, having declared it a failure. Other, similar ceremonies have been held since. A broad number of Papuans continue to view special autonomy with suspicion and are unsupportive of the new institutional arrangement.

The decline of violence after democratization resulted from the dominance of moderate, civilian organizations in the first few years following the end of the Suharto regime. The congresses and the PDP created broad support until the government started repressing them in 2000. Since then, neither violent groups such as the OPM, nor civilian organizations have been able to re-create a strong, single leadership. Papuans remain divided between an organization now espousing the use of formal channels created under the special autonomy law, while a large, discontented majority of Papuans have few alternatives to representation. The DPA has attempted to play such a leadership role but it has not gained the ascendancy of the former PDP. In the face of division and lack of organization, violence and organized protest activities are rare, but it disguises continued deep conflict.

## Multiple organizations and violence: marginalization and the weakness of moderate alternatives

A few observations emerge from this overview of six cases. Given that we selected cases on variance of outcomes, obviously we see varied patterns of violence following democratization. More significantly, in all cases, we observe with democratization an increase in the number of organizations claiming to represent an ethnic group. They are often splinter groups from a dominant rebellious organization that operated under authoritarian rule, but occasionally new organizations or channels of representation are created. Democratization generally leads to multiple organizations and competition. Beyond these observations, however, further processes influence violent outcomes.

First, there is a striking parallel in the starting point of almost all of these cases. Authoritarian regimes generated a sufficient amount of resentment among ethnic minorities that armed organizations were formed and violence chosen. These organizations tend to be dominant under authoritarian regimes and enjoy popular support. This was certainly the case for ETA in Spain, the MNLF in Mindanao and MISURA in Nicaragua, and to a lesser extent the OPM and GAM in Indonesia, as well as the MFDC in Senegal. In these latter cases, organizations were dominant but not necessarily capable of sustaining violent attacks in the last few years of the authoritarian regime. Their popularity was also not as easy to assess, given the levels of repression. In all cases, of course, repression by the armed forces was high. Nevertheless, repression in itself was not always a

barrier to mounting rebellious activities. While it was certainly the case for some organizations, such as GAM or the OPM, it was not the case for the MNLF or MISURA. A longer view of the role of repression under authoritarian regimes would enable the identification of the circumstances under which intra-group ethnic organizations consider violent rebellion to be a viable strategy. Of course, this falls way beyond the scope of our current analysis.

Second, democratization or sometimes liberalization prior to democratization created institutional incentives for a split in intra-group ethnic organizations. A significant exception is the MNLF, from which the MILF emerged as an alternative guerrilla organization without any impetus from democratization. It was also the only case with competing violent organizations and only minor ideological differences. Others, such as ETA and MFDC, split during a climate of liberalization that created some space for political mobilization. Such a window allowed ETA-pm to pursue a political strategy alongside a military one, and to reject the pure armed struggle espoused by its rival ETA-m. Such a decision was further stimulated by its perception that it needed to compete against the moderate PNV for support, which quickly re-established itself as a representative of Basque interests after the fall of the Franco regime. MFDC, on the other hand, split into moderate and extreme factions, whereby the Northern Front chose to cooperate with the government in order to focus on the economic development of the Casamance region.

Third, moderate organizations either returned or were created to occupy the space between armed ethnic organizations and the government. In some cases, splinter organizations from rebellious organizations chose, as previously mentioned, paths that are more conciliatory. In other cases, moderate organizations returned, such as the PNV in Spain, or new ones were created. MISATAN, for instance, was created specifically to provide a new platform for dialogue between the government and the Miskitos, although it was initiated by the government and so obtained little support. In Papua, the Papuan People's Congress created the PDP to represent Papuan demands through dialogue and negotiation. A similar but weaker role was played by Aceh's umbrella organization SIRA, which never crystallized into a well-structured alternative organization to GAM. Nevertheless, SIRA offered a new channel for protest and channelling of Acehnese grievances.

Fourth, against this backdrop of increased numbers of organizations and competition, violence persisted in cases where armed organizations felt marginalized or where moderate options were quickly reduced. The first few years of transition to democracy are crucial. During that period, popular support has often been spread relatively evenly according to violent organizations, splinter groups, or new moderate organizations. After a democratic regime stabilizes, some organizations lose their support once new channels for representation have been established. Often one organization becomes a strong and credible representative that negotiates new settlements with the government.

Among organizations that continued to use violence as a means to assert their presence, ETA and the Southern Front of the MFDC offer interesting parallels.

They faced a loss of support and increasing marginalization. They continued violent strategies in an attempt to regain their lost dominant position and undermine moderate organizations seeking compromise with the government. Facing the strengthening power of moderate organizations, however, their actions soon became irrelevant. As a result, ETA-m and the Southern Front's attacks diminished over time. In the case of the Southern Front of the MFDC, it became a different kind of organization, no longer advancing separatism.

Other organizations continued violence where moderate organizations failed. In almost all cases where violence diminished, moderate organizations represented significant alternatives that allowed for a negotiated settlement with the government. Where governments were most open to settlement, moderate organizations largely prevailed. The case of Nicaragua is clearly striking in this respect, where negotiations included all parties and where a settlement led to profound changes in the organization of the Nicaraguan state. Lesser compromises were still effective, where moderates gained ascendancy, as in Spain and Senegal. On the other hand, violence resumed and moderates were closed off in Aceh, where GAM gained dominance and popularity as it became evident that the civilian movement behind SIRA was obtaining few results. The slow and unconvincing approach of the Indonesian state was costly as it undermined a moderate alternative and contributed to the subsequent rise of violence and support for GAM.

Mindanao and Papua see mixed processes at work. In the Philippines, given competition between two strong armed organizations, the continued violence occurred because of the marginalization of the MILF, and failure of the MNLF to provide a convincing alternative once it reached a negotiated settlement. The MILF was marginalized from the negotiation process, in contrast to the Nicaraguan approach of including all organizations. As a result, it continued its attacks following the 1996 peace agreement with the MNLF, and then benefited from growing support for continued violence as the agreement met with little sustained political support from the Philippine government. In Papua, the government offered few moderate alternatives, since it refused to negotiate with the PDP and instead worked with a weak set of Papuan officials toward a limited form of autonomy. In this case, however, the OPM had already reduced its violent tactics and had chosen to follow the PDP. When the latter was repressed, it was difficult for the OPM to launch new attacks, since it had always been very weak.

Democratization, then, has very significant effects on the number of intra-group ethnic organizations, competition between them and the support they receive from their constituencies. During democratic transition, these organizations reached a height of competition as moderates and extremists sought to establish their relevance. State responses at this point are important. Where rapid and genuine concessions occur, they often contribute to the elimination or marginalization of violent organizations, but sometimes the reduction in violence is delayed. Nevertheless, cases show that violence persists or increases only in cases where moderates are unable to gain ascendancy in the new democratic environment and when the state is reluctant to compromise.

# Notes

1 Although difficult to establish empirically, given the restricted access to the region in the 1990s and paucity of empirical research, long discussions in 1996 with Jafar Siddiq Hamzah, a prominent Acehnese human rights lawyer, and a brief visit to Lhokseumawe provided some indication of this direction. Subsequent mobilization of GAM in 1998 showed the extent of support.
2 *Gatra* 6, no. 1, 20 November 1999; *Tempo* 29, no. 37, 13–19 November 2000.
3 Interview, former GAM leader, 28 March 2008, Banda Aceh (Indonesia).
4 The Diola ethnic group make up 60 per cent of the population in Casamance, but only 5 per cent in Senegal. The Diola and other groups in the Casamance region are predominantly Christian and animist, whereas the majority in northern Senegal are Muslim. Different dialects of the Jola language are spoken across the Casamance region, which are, for the most part, mutually intelligible. The Diola are the main group driving separatism in the Casamance region, but other indigenous groups also identify with the cause and participate in the MFDC.
5 The agreement provided for a full withdrawal of military forces and an end to hostilities. It also facilitated the release of Diamacoune Senghor.
6 The year 1972 marks the beginning of the martial law period, although Marcos had become increasingly authoritarian during his second term (1969–1972).
7 The Sumus, Ramas, Creoles and Garifunas also make their home on the Atlantic Coast. It is a mistake to treat the indigenes of the Atlantic Coast as a single ethnic group, but some members of these groups have joined Miskito-dominated ethnic organizations to pursue autonomy and group rights at various times. However, they have also come into conflict with one another over politics in the Atlantic Coast region and formed different organizations to represent their different viewpoints.
8 ALPROMISU called itself an organization of Miskitos and Sumus, but Miskitos dominated its leadership and composition.
9 MISURASATA did mobilize as an armed movement against the Sandinistas in alliance with the Revolutionary Democratic Alliance (ARDE) from 1982 to 1984, but with a much smaller force than MISURA.
10 Interview, Theys Eluay, 8 August 2001, Sentani, Papua (Indonesia).